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CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Sean D. Murphy *
The States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will likely
vote in 2010 on whether to amend the Rome Statute to allow the ICC to prosecute
the crime of aggression. If a robust amendment is widely ratified by states, and if
the mechanism for triggering ICC jurisdiction in a particular situation is the ICC
itself, then the ICC may emerge as an important voice in the debate over the
legality of humanitarian intervention taken without Security Council
authorization. Prosecutions, or at least indictments, of leaders of those
interventions would considerably strengthen the hand of those who regard such
intervention as illegal. Yet an unwillingness on the part of the ICC to indict and
prosecute those leaders—an outcome that seems likely for incidents of true
humanitarian intervention—may lend considerable credence to the view that such
intervention is lawful, as well as define the conditions that characterize such
intervention.
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” essentially contemplates the use of military
force by one state (or a group of states) against another state not in self-defense but, rather, to
prevent the widespread deprivation of human rights. While such use of force might occur
pursuant to authorization of the Security Council, the doctrine’s principal relevance is to serve as
a potential legal justification for a state or states to act without Security Council authorization,
conduct sometimes referred to as “unilateral” humanitarian intervention.
As discussed in Part I below, the dominant belief among states and scholars of
international law is that unilateral humanitarian intervention is not a valid legal justification for
using force. Security Council authorization must be obtained for any such intervention; where
such consent is not forthcoming, the values served by maintaining a strong normative system
One jury, however, “remains out” in the sense that it has not yet weighed in on the issue
of humanitarian intervention. As discussed in Part II, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC), will likely vote in 2010 on
whether to amend the Rome Statute so as to allow the ICC to investigate and prosecute the crime
of aggression. The language to be adopted is not yet settled, but it seems unlikely that unilateral
humanitarian intervention will be expressly included or excluded from the Rome Statute’s
definition of aggression, or from the associated “elements of the crime” that will likely be crafted
before entry into force of the amendment. While the amendment (and associated elements) may
provide some openings for the argument that unilateral humanitarian intervention implicitly does
not fall within the scope of such a crime, it seems more likely that the acts that typically underlie
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such intervention (large-scale deployment of troops or delivery of bombs across a border
against a non-consenting government) will implicitly fall within the scope of the crime of
aggression for purposes of the ICC. If that is the case, this article argues that there is an ironic
chance (but not certainty) that the ICC, over time, will serve as a “jury” that results in the
crystallization of a norm permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention.
Numerous hurdles must be overcome before the ICC could serve such a function, hurdles
that should not be minimized. An amendment to the Rome Statute does need to be adopted by
the Assembly, most of the states parties must then ratify the amendment to bring it into force, the
amendment must be crafted so as not to allow states parties to opt out of its reach in any
significant ways, and the amendment must be applied in a manner that reaches the conduct of
states generally, including non-parties that use force against the territory of states parties.
Even if those hurdles are overcome, the mere fact that the ICC mandate is broad enough
to potentially encompass prosecutions of leaders who engage in unilateral humanitarian
intervention will likely not affect the debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention; such
an effect would occur only if the Rome Statute expressly included (or excluded) such
intervention as part of the crime of aggression. Further, if the mechanism for triggering ICC
investigation of a crime of aggression is solely the Security Council, or perhaps the General
Assembly or the International Court of Justice, then the ICC’s adoption of this jurisdiction likely
will not affect the debate over the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, since it is
unlikely that those institutions will consistently, impartially, and apolitically “pull the trigger” for
ICC jurisdiction over a given situation, conditions necessary for clarifying the law in this area.
However, if a relatively robust amendment is widely ratified by states, and if the
mechanism for triggering an ICC investigation is the ICC itself (the prosecutor acting alone or in
conjunction with the Pre-Trial Chamber), then this article maintains that there may well be a
significant effect on the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention, driven by how the
ICC responds when incidents of unilateral humanitarian intervention arise over which it has
jurisdiction. Prosecutions, or at least indictments, of leaders of those interventions would
considerably strengthen the hand of those who oppose unilateral humanitarian intervention. Yet
an unwillingness on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an outcome that
seems quite likely for incidents of true humanitarian intervention—may lend considerable
credence to the view that unilateral humanitarian intervention is lawful, as well as define the
conditions that characterize such intervention.
To demonstrate that likelihood, this article revisits NATO’s 1999 intervention to protect
Kosovar Albanians. Having reached that incident’s tenth anniversary, it is worth asking whether
such action, had it arisen at a time when there existed an ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, would have resulted in the indictment of NATO leaders by the ICC. If not, then it
may unfold that true humanitarian interventions—interventions generally recognized as largely
altruistic acts to protect those facing extreme peril—will be viewed as lawful even in the absence
of Security Council authorization. If so, then the ICC will have assumed a very significant role in
altering the perceptions of the international community concerning the use of force, potentially in
a manner that significantly diminishes the role of the U.N. Security Council. Assumption of such
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a role may propel the ICC to significant heights as the “go-to” arbiter on the legality of the use of
force, or may result in extraordinary criticism of its work and concerns about its fidelity to strict
construction of the law.
Part I of this article briefly explains the conflicting views among states and in the
academy about the legality of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and why several
possible avenues for “jurying” legality to date have proven unhelpful. Part II then considers the
likely approach of granting the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, with a focus on the
ratification process for the amendment, and on the substance and procedure of that jurisdiction as
it relates to humanitarian intervention. If various important hurdles can be overcome (which may
well not be the case), this part tentatively concludes that such jurisdiction most likely will result,
over time, in the crystallization of a norm that permits unilateral humanitarian intervention. Part
III tests that conclusion by revisiting the Kosovo incident, which is probably the strongest
precedent to date in favor of the legality of humanitarian intervention, to assess whether it would
have provoked ICC indictments had there existed, at that time, an ICC with jurisdiction over a
crime of aggression. Part IV concludes with some speculations on how inclusion of a robust
crime of aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction might affect views not just on the legality of
unilateral humanitarian intervention, but also on what is meant by such intervention, and further
the potential benefits and risks for the ICC in assuming such a role.
I. THE (IL)LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A.

Conflicting Views on the Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Virtually all states, key non-state actors, and scholars agree that humanitarian
intervention may proceed when authorized by the U.N. Security Council. 1 While it is true that
the drafters of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter probably envisaged some kind of transnational
threat to or breach of the peace prior to Security Council action, the Charter does not expressly
require such an act, nor does it preclude viewing the transnational agitation that typically arises
from widespread deprivations of human rights within a state from being within the scope of
1

See, e.g., Jennifer M. Welsh, The Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention, in
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 535, 535–36 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds.,
2008) (“[W]hile the Council initially was reluctant to authorize force in circumstances involving
the mistreatment of a state’s civilians, it has gradually asserted its competence through an
expanded definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”); THOMAS
M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 137
(2002) (“Each of the instances in which the Council has used, or authorized coalitions of the
willing to use collective measures . . . against regimes engaged in egregious human rights
violations can be fitted in to the Charter text.”); SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 287-88 (1996) (reflecting
on U.N. practice in the 1990’s and noting that a “threat to the peace” triggering Security Council
jurisdiction under Chapter VII is now regarded as encompassing internal conflict, including
humanitarian crises).

4
Chapter VII. In any event, the consistent interpretation of Chapter VII by the Security
Council—particularly with respect to the recent interventions authorized in Haiti, Rwanda, and
Somalia—makes clear that widespread deprivations of human rights can serve as the basis for
authorizing the use of military force under the authority of Chapter VII. 2
The more contentious issue is the legality of humanitarian intervention without U.N.
Security Council authorization. The remainder of this article is concerned with such
unauthorized or “unilateral” humanitarian intervention. Most states and scholars view unilateral
humanitarian intervention as unlawful, finding no basis in the U.N. Charter or state practice in
support of the doctrine.3 Only rarely have incidents occurred that might be viewed as unilateral
humanitarian intervention, and, when they do occur, they are often criticized or condemned by
states and sometimes other relevant actors, such as the Security Council or the General
Assembly. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo intervention, Adam Roberts
explained the resistance of states to unilateral humanitarian intervention as follows:
Several large and powerful states (China, India and Russia) have expressed strong
opposition to the principle of humanitarian intervention. Equally important, large
numbers of post-colonial states, particularly in Africa and Asia, have opposed it. Many
such states have a healthy suspicion of the proposition that the motives of would-be
intervenors are, and will remain, purely humanitarian. Also, many such states see
themselves as vulnerable to foreign intervention, and are understandably sensitive about
threats to their newly-won sovereignty. In some cases, other and less creditable
considerations are involved, including the desire of oppressive regimes to stop the
emergence of a new norm that might upset their monopoly of power within their states. 4
Either in the context of specific incidents or looking more broadly at the legality of uses
of military force, the General Assembly historically has disfavored intervention, even for noble
purposes, as amply demonstrated by the three prominent General Assembly resolutions on nonintervention passed in the 1960s and 1970s. 5 Indeed, the General Assembly’s 1974 “Definition
2

See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 145–281.
See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 49 (2d ed.
2004) (2000) (finding that “the doctrine is far from firmly established in international law”);
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 177–203 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds.,
2003); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–87 (2001); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1999).
4
See Adam Roberts, The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention, 2000 Y.B.
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 32.
5
See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21,
1966) (“No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other
3
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of Aggression” enumerated various acts that constitute “aggression,” including the “invasion or
attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State,” and provided that no
“consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve
as a justification for aggression.” 6 Those resolutions were passed in an era when newly emerging
states were reacting to the abuses of colonialism, and to the fear of Cold War interference by the
major powers, but many of those suspicions linger today. 7 When foreign ministers of the nonaligned movement met in Catagena in 2000, they reiterated a “firm condemnation of all
unilateral military actions including those made without property authorisation from the United
Nations Security Council” and rejected “the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which
has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of international law.” 8 Most
recently, in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document, the General Assembly considered the
problem of responding to major human rights crises through military force and appeared to
contemplate only action through the U.N. Security Council. 9

forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. . . . The strict observance of these
obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one
another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the
Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten peace
and security.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), annex, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1971) (“No State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and
cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”).
6
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1975).
7
Drawing in part upon the General Assembly’s views, the International Court in the
Nicaragua/U.S. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case cast doubt on
the ability of states to use force to protect human rights, (Nicar. V. U.S.), Merits, Judgments,
1986 I.C.J. 14, at 134–35 (June 27), or to bring about regime change, id. at 133, ¶ 263, though in
that case the facts and arguments pled to the Court were not directly on those issues.
8
MOVEMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, XIII Ministerial Conference, Cartagena,
Colombia, FINAL DOCUMENT, ¶ 11, 263 (Apr. 8-9, 2000), available at
http://www.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/index.html.
9
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct.
24, 2005) (“In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case basis . . . should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”); but see Stahn, infra note
19, at 120 (arguing that “states did not categorically reject the option of (individual or collective)
unilateral action in the Outcome Document. This discrepancy leaves some leeway to argue that
the concept of responsibility to protect is not meant to rule out such action in the future.”).

6
Generally speaking, opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention favor the
strictest of controls on transnational uses of force, distrusting the creation of loopholes that
aggressors will seek to exploit. Some opponents, however, are open to the possibility of
humanitarian intervention, but simply do not see existing treaties or state practice as supporting
it. Especially in the wake of the Kosovo incident, some of these scholars10 and former U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan 11 became more open to seeing a nascent trend toward acceptance
of humanitarian intervention, but nevertheless were cautious in finding that a new rule had not
yet crystallized.
By contrast, some scholars and a few states, notably the United Kingdom 12 and
10

See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO
REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 172 (2000) [hereinafter
Kosovo Report] (“[T]he current fluidity of international law on humanitarian intervention,
caught between strict Charter prohibitions of non-defensive uses of force and more permissive
patterns of state practice with respect to humanitarian interventions and counter-terrorist use of
force.”); Christine Chinkin, The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) Under International Law, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 910, 920 (2000)
(acknowledging that there may be an “emerging concept of humanitarian intervention based
upon the purposes of the Charter, the growing commitment to the active protection of human
rights and limited State practice”); Vaughan Lowe, International Legal Issues Arising in the
Kosovo Crisis, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 934, 941 (2000) (“[I]n my view there is no clear legal
justification for the NATO action in Kosovo, but it is desirable that such a justification be
allowed to emerge in customary international law.”).
11
In his annual report to the General Assembly in 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated:
This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians
from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to
the international community. Any such evolution in our understanding of State
sovereignty and individual sovereignty will, in some quarters, be met with
distrust, skepticism, even hostility. But it is an evolution that we should welcome.
Why? Because, despite its limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a
humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity
that will do more, and not less, to end it.
Press Release, The Secretary-General, Annual Report to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM7136 (Sept. 20, 1999), reprinted in KOFI ANNAN, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION:
STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 44 (1999). For sharp criticism of the SecretaryGeneral’s position, see Edward Luttwak, Kofi’s Rule: Humanitarian Intervention and
Neocolonialism, 58 NAT’L INT. 60 (Winter 1999–00).
12

The United Kingdom justified its participation in the intervention relating to Kosovo as
follows:
We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal

7
Belgium, have claimed that there already exists a legal norm in favor of unilateral humanitarian
intervention, based on interpretations of the U.N. Charter or on a generous reading of limited
state practice, including the interventions of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in
1998, the tripartite intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 and southern Iraq in 1992, and the
Kosovo incident, all of which were largely accepted or at least tolerated by the global
community. 14 While they place some emphasis on positive law (as evidenced by treaties, state
practice, and other forms of state consent), proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention
often advance arguments that are essentially grounded in morality, natural law, or political
theory. 15 Indeed, to a certain extent one can view the legal debate on this issue as one between
13

justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Those circumstances clearly
exist in Kosovo. The use of force . . . can be justified as an exceptional measure in
support of the purposes laid down by the UN Security Council, but without the
Council’s express authorization, when that is the only means to avert an
immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.
U.K. Defence Secretary George Robertson, 328 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 616–17; see
also U.N. SCOR, Fifty-Fourth Sess., 3988 mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 23, 1999)
(comments of U.K. Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock explaining that: “In these circumstances,
and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military
intervention is legally justifiable”); Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force
(Serb. & Mont. v. U.K.), at 13 (May 11, 1999), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/113/4573.pdf (U.K. Attorney-General John Morris repeating such language);
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Written Answer for House of Commons, 330 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th
ser.) (1999) 239-40; MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 99 (2005) (discussing the U.K. position). It
should be noted that the U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee rejected the U.K.
position, finding that international law did not allow unilateral humanitarian intervention. See
HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOURTH REPORT ON KOSOVO, 19992000, ¶ 128, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm (“Our
conclusion is that Operation Allied Force was contrary to the specific terms of what might be
termed the basic law of the international community—the UN Charter.”); see also Steven
Wheatley, The Foreign Affairs Select Committee Report on Kosovo: NATO Action and
Humanitarian Intervention, 5 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 261 (2000).
13

See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, Oral
Proceedings at 7 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf.
14
See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN
FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008); CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: LAW AND POLICY (2001); see also Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A
Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
15
See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
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“positivists” (opposing unilateral humanitarian intervention) and “naturalists” (favoring
such intervention by adhering closely—even if not explicitly—to natural law, derived from the
rudimentary values held by the “global society”). For the proponents of humanitarian
intervention, international law exists only in part to preserve the sanctity of states; the dignity of
persons is of equal value and in some situations “trumps” the values protected by strict rules on
non-intervention.
In between these two positions may be found a few scholars or institutions that view
humanitarian intervention as unlawful, but accept or at least acknowledge that such action may
be legitimate and hence will be tacitly accepted by the global community when it occurs. For
example, Professor Thomas Franck states that it is “difficult conceptually to justify in Charter
terms the use of force by one or several states acting without prior Security Council
authorization, even when such action is taken to enforce human rights and humanitarian values,”
but that contemporary practice “suggests either a graduated reinterpretation by the United
Nations itself of Article 2(4) or the evolution of a subsidiary adjectival international law of
mitigation, one that may formally continue to assert the illegality of state recourse to force but
which, in ascertainable circumstances, mitigates the consequence of such wrongful acts by
imposing no, or only nominal, consequences on states which, by their admittedly wrongful
intervention, have demonstrably prevented the occurrence of some greater wrong.” 16 Along this
line, an Independent International Commission on Kosovo, initiated by Sweden shortly after the
Kosovo incident and chaired by former South African Justice Richard Goldstone, issued a report
stating that the NATO military intervention was illegal under international law, because it did
not have the consent of the Security Council, but was “legitimate,” both from a political and
AND MORALITY (3d ed. 2005) (advancing an argument largely grounded in Kantian philosophy);
NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 295 (2000) (advancing an “solidarist” conception of international society in which

states must accept a moral responsibility to protect their citizens).
16
Franck, supra note 1, at 137, 139 (emphasis added); see also Thomas M. Franck,
Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 325 (2005)
(suggesting that “a violation of the law is not always deplorable and may even be a good thing”);
Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 130 (J. L.
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS AND
ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB. INT’L LAW, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2000),
available at http://cms.web-beat.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/AIV_13_Eng.pdf (report by
non-governmental Dutch advisory council which endorses the “illegal but legitimate” concept);
Ige F. Dekker, Illegality and Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, 6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.
115 (2001) (discussing the Dutch report); DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 103 (1999) (“Despite the lack of a legal basis for
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorisation in existing international law, it
is hardly realistic in the foreseeable future that states should altogether refrain from such
intervention if it is deemed imperative on moral and political grounds.”); OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 118, 125-26 (1991) (finding that while unilateral
humanitarian intervention is illegal, if supported generally by states it should be pardoned).

9
moral point of view. Similarly, an International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) (established by the Government of Canada) issued a December 2001 report,
entitled The Responsibility to Protect, which sought to provide a legal and ethical foundation for
humanitarian intervention. 18 The report asserted that a responsibility to protect (or “R2P”) 19
exists under international law. Further, the report stated that in circumstances when the Security
Council fails to discharge that responsibility, “in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for
action,” then it “is a real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the
damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if
human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.” 20
17

By contrast, a 2005 U.N. high-level panel convened by Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
writing in the wake of the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, agreed with the ICISS that there existed
an “emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect,” but
concluded that armed force may be used to ensure fulfillment of that the responsibility only if so
authorized by the Security Council. 21 Further, the high-level panel identified five criteria of
“legitimacy” when engaging in such intervention, including to the seriousness of the threat, the
proper purpose of the interveners, the exhaustion of other means, proportionality, and a
balancing of the ensuing consequences. 22 The U.N. Secretary-General thereafter generally
endorsed the high-level panel’s approach, 23 though without expressly adopting the five criteria
nor expressly ruling out unilateral humanitarian intervention.
An important component in the diversity of views on this issue concerns the role of the
Security Council. Proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention view the Council as an
unreliable arbiter of the legality of uses of force, since some permanent members have been
willing to block actions that a majority on the Security Council sees as appropriate. Again, the
Kosovo incident presents the dilemma; many Security Council members favored armed
intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians, but Russia (along with China) opposed doing so. By
17

KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 163–98 (2000).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp [hereinafter
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT].
19
For a discussion of the emergence of this concept, see Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); see also
Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004,
136, 137 (“Like the responsibility to protect, the duty to prevent begins from the premise that the
rules now governing the use of force, devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter, are
inadequate.”).
20
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 18, ¶ 6.37.
21
The Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2005); see also id. ¶¶ 196, 272.
22
Id. ¶ 207.
23
The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
18
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contrast, opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention argue that the whole point in
drafting the U.N. Charter was to create a system that—unlike the League of Nations system—
would attract participation by the major powers by according them a special status for
determining when non-defensive uses of force should be deployed and when they should not. By
moving away from that system, the special status of the permanent members of the Security
Council is degraded, thereby introducing a level of instability in the system by making it less
attractive to the major powers. For opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the
solution to the problem of Security Council inaction is not to abandon the existing system, but
instead to remain faithful to the Charter as written, with the hope that the permanent members
will generally act in unison when situations truly requiring humanitarian intervention arise.
Indeed, opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention point out that Security Council
unwillingness to authorize intervention often arises from the reluctance of any state to step
forward with the resources needed to respond to a humanitarian crisis, a problem that is not
solved by altering the focal point for authorizing intervention.
Another important component in the debate over unilateral humanitarian intervention
concerns the current status of the United States in international affairs. The United States is the
preeminent military, diplomatic, economic, political, and cultural power in the world. The United
States can marshal the resources needed for humanitarian intervention around the globe in a way
that is largely not available to any other state. At least in the short run, many opponents of
humanitarian intervention are not very worried about lots of other states aggressively invoking
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, at least no more so than they are worried about those
states invading neighbors on spurious grounds of self-defense. Instead, many worry about an
unchecked United States—in conjunction with its allies—deploying military force to protect
human rights when it wishes to do so, and refraining in situations where it prefers inaction. They
would like to see more global supervision of the U.S. decision to intervene and perhaps even a
global ability to prod the United States into action when it would otherwise stay home.
B.

Looking for an Arbiter of Legality

States and scholars participating in this debate have emphasized different sources as a
means of supporting one position or the other. When assessing incidents of state practice that
arguably constitute unilateral humanitarian intervention, one approach has been to scrutinize the
formal and informal reactions of important organs, such as the Security Council, the General
Assembly, or the International Court of Justice, since these entities might be seen as serving as a
“jury” for the global community about the legality or legitimacy of the conduct. As Thomas
Franck, who coined the term in this context, indicated:
Pronouncing on the validity of claims advanced in mitigation of an unlawful but
justifiable recourse to force is the task of those decision-makers. Some of this
fact-and-context-specific calibration goes on in international tribunals, but most of
it occurs in the political organs of the UN system, which constitutes something
approximating a global jury; assessing the facts of a crisis, the motives of those
reacting to the crisis, and the bona fides of the pleas of extreme necessity. This
jurying goes on not only in instances of humanitarian intervention but whenever
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there is a confrontation between the strict, literal text of the Charter and a plea of
justice and extenuating moral necessity.24
This jurying function might be performed before the intervention takes place (ex ante jurying) or,
more likely, after the intervention takes place (ex post jurying). For Professor Franck, these
organs have “demonstrated their ability and readiness, when faced with states’ recourse to force,
to calibrate their responses by sophisticated judgment, taking into account the full panoply of
specific circumstances.” 25 Consequently, after analyzing eight incidents of possible unilateral
humanitarian intervention, Franck concludes that the “jurors” have regarded such actions as
being justified. 26
Professor Franck’s approach has intuitive appeal. The original meaning of the U.N.
Charter can change in light of subsequent U.N. practice, even on core issues relating to the
Security Council. The U.N. Charter is, after all, a multilateral treaty (“albeit a treaty having
certain special characteristics”) 27 one that is subject to the customary rules of treaty
interpretation, which take account of both the object and purpose of the treaty and of subsequent
state practice. 28 There is ample World Court jurisprudence supporting the use of subsequent state
practice when interpreting the charters or constitutions of international organizations, as well as
supporting the use of a principle of effectiveness, whereby the Court seeks to determine the
purposes and objectives of the organization and to give to the words in question an interpretation
which is most conducive to the achievement of those ends.29 To a certain extent, the entire
history of Security Council conflict management is one that finds no clear textual support in the
U.N. Charter: the numerous U.N. peacekeeping deployments have no express or even strongly
implied basis in the Charter; and Security Council authorization of forcible deployments—such
as authorization of the coalition of states that expelled Iraq from Kuwait—are not firmly
anchored in the original scheme of Articles 43-49, which contemplated national contingents
being made available to the United Nations “on its call” for deployment under U.N. command
and control. 30
At the same time, Professor Franck’s approach has been criticized for failing to explain
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certain methodological choices that are implicit in his analysis. 31 Most of the analysis
turns on the conduct of the Security Council, rather than other organs, which is an important
methodological choice, since it favors “jurying” by just fifteen states, including the five powerful
permanent members, rather than the broader community of states. Further, it is not clear how
Franck’s methodology weighs the reluctance of intervenors to explicitly base their action upon a
right of humanitarian intervention, nor why the failure of an organ to act should be construed as
tacit approval of an intervention.
In fact, the above-mentioned U.N. organs have been unable or unwilling consistently
either to authorize or to prohibit recourse of humanitarian intervention ex ante, or to scrutinize
incidents of alleged humanitarian intervention after they have arisen, thus undermining those
organs’ ability to forcefully condemn, support, or support with caveats the legality of unilateral
humanitarian intervention. Ex ante authorization by the Security Council sometimes has been
possible (thereby obviating any need to resort to unilateral humanitarian intervention), but no
other organ has acted ex ante either to authorize or to prohibit unilateral humanitarian
intervention. Some have speculated that, after Kosovo, perhaps Security Council practice would
evolve into use of an “inverted veto” on issues of humanitarian intervention, whereby any
collective intervention would be deemed permissible unless the Security Council passed a
resolution precluding the action. 32 No apparent consensus has formed among states regarding the
acceptability of such an approach, perhaps because it opens a rather wide loophole. Any group of
states, perhaps as small as just a few, could declare themselves a “collectivity” and proceed with
an intervention, so long as they are confident that they have the support of at least one permanent
member (thereby avoiding a resolution cutting off the intervention). Further, any permanent
member could conduct humanitarian interventions without worry, since it could always veto a
Security Council resolution to the contrary.
The problem with post hoc reactions by these organs is that they are unpredictable
(sometimes formal reactions are made and sometimes they are not) and can be viewed as
political in nature (it is not always clear that the members of the institution are reacting based on
their perception of what international law requires, as opposed to each member’s political
preferences). Thus, opponents and proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention, looking at
the same practice of these institutions, will draw quite different conclusions about the meaning
and relevance of the institutional conduct.
Consider, for example, the possibility of looking to the General Assembly for ex ante or
post hoc authorization or prohibition of an intervention. This possibility is already available,

31

See Michael Byers, Book Review, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 721 (2003).
Louis Henkin speculated that “the likely lesson of Kosovo is that states, or
collectivities, confident that the Security Council will acquiesce in their decision to intervene,
will shift the burden of the veto; instead of seeking authorization in advance by resolution
subject to veto, states or collectivities will act, and challenge the Council to terminate the
action.” Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
824, 827 (1999).
32

13
under the General Assembly’s 1950 “Uniting for Peace Resolution,” 33 which contemplates
General Assembly “recommendations” for military measures in response to breaches of the
peace or acts of aggression. Under this resolution, any member state may request that the
General Assembly convene an emergency session, which occurs promptly if a majority of U.N.
members inform the Secretary-General (or seven members of the Security Council) that they
concur in the request. 34 By doing so whenever a situation has arisen where unilateral
humanitarian intervention seems imminent, or has already occurred, the General Assembly could
serve as the definitive “juror” on the legality of the matter. (Alternatively, the General Assembly
might adopt an entirely new organic resolution specifically on the subject of humanitarian
intervention, either flatly prohibiting it or in some fashion supporting it. In the latter case, such a
resolution could conceivably contain an “inverse” authorization, meaning that a proposed
humanitarian intervention, once notified to the General Assembly, can proceed unless there is an
affirmative General Assembly vote that the intervention should not occur.)
For political, formal, and practical reasons, the General Assembly has not assumed this
mantle. Politically, there is disagreement among states on what to do about the issue of
humanitarian intervention; there would likely not be a uniform position on either condemning or
approving such action, or approving it subject to certain conditions. Formally, the U.N. Charter
Chapter IV makes clear that the General Assembly plays a secondary role to the Security
Council on matters relating to peace and security, 35 which generally chills the General Assembly
from taking a lead on such matters. Even if the Security Council is not exercising its “functions”
in respect of a particular dispute or situation, the General Assembly is only supposed to make
“recommendations” to the Security Council about how to proceed, which can be construed as
supporting military deployments consented to by the host state (the prototypical peacekeeping
scenario), but not the deployment of military units for an enforcement action. 36
Moreover, as a practical matter, the General Assembly’s arrogation of power through the
Uniting for Peace Resolution never fully developed during the Cold War despite constant
deadlock at the Security Council. The problem was that, to conduct any significant military
intervention, the financial and military support of one or more of the major powers was needed,
and those states did not wish to see the General Assembly take the lead in this area, since it
would clearly detract from the power and significance of the Security Council.37 For the United
States, this became especially true as the General Assembly mutated over time from something
relatively within the control of the Western states to a body entirely outside their control.
Consequently, if the General Assembly were to attempt an ex ante or post hoc role for unilateral
33
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humanitarian interventions, it would likely face situations where (1) it votes in favor of
military action, but finds no support among those states expected to conduct the action; (2) it
votes in favor of a military action, and certain states prove willing to conduct that action, but
those states neither wanted nor sought General Assembly approval; or (3) it votes against a
military action, and one or more powers go forward anyway on grounds that the General
Assembly cannot arrogate to itself this power. Any of these scenarios would weaken the
authority of the General Assembly, and inhibits this organ from venturing into the arena.
The International Court of Justice also faces difficulty in serving as a reliable “juror” for
either ex ante or post hoc authorization/prohibition of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In
some ways, the International Court could be an ideal surrogate for a deadlocked Security
Council; like the Council, the Court consists of fifteen members (judges), traditionally consisting
of five judges from each of the permanent members of the Security Council and ten judges from
the different regions of the world. However, unlike the Security Council, there is no veto power
in the International Court; judges from the major powers can and have been outvoted by the
other judges. Although regarded by some as a bit ossified, the Court is a serious institution; there
is a gravity to the work of the Court that garners respect in the legal world and there is a fair
amount of fidelity by states to the Court’s rulings. 38 Further, as a judicial institution its
pronouncements are generally regarded as driven by law not politics.
The Court, however, does not have jurisdiction simply to assume the role of deciding ex
ante or post hoc the legality of a proposed/actual exercise of unilateral humanitarian
intervention; the matter must be properly placed before the Court. The most likely manner for
this to occur would be through a request for an advisory opinion from the General Assembly.
Probably for the same reason that the General Assembly is resistant to serving itself as a “juror”
of a proposed intervention, the General Assembly has declined to place potential incidents of
humanitarian intervention, such as Kosovo, before the International Court for consideration. As
for contentious cases, since the Court’s inception, jurisdiction over the lawfulness of forcible
action has arisen in only a handful of cases; states do not habitually resort to the court when force
has been used against them, and when states do, they are often constrained in the jurisdictional
basis that they can plead. Such jurisdictional limitation is amply demonstrated in Georgia’s
recent case against Russia for the movement in August 2008 of extensive Russian troops into
Georgia—a case predicated on an alleged Russian violation of Article 2(4), but instead on a
violation of a human rights treaty concerning racial discrimination. 39 Hence, the Court’s
capability for “jurying” on this subject is quite limited. 40
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Regional organizations also face difficulty in serving as an ex ante or post hoc “juror” of
the legality of recourse to humanitarian intervention. Chapter VIII of the Charter clearly
contemplates the ability of states, operating regionally, to deal “with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.” 41 Yet
while that language in Article 52(1) is not conditioned upon authorization of the Security
Council, in Article 53(1), 42 where reference is made to “enforcement action,” Security Council
authorization is required. Moreover, the credibility associated with non-defensive actions of
regional organizations derives from the consent granted by their member states to help promote
peace and security within the region; that theory breaks down when the regional organization is
operating outside the region, such as NATO did in Serbia.
In short, while various existing international entities above might serve as “jurors” of the
legality of a proposed or actual resort to unilateral humanitarian intervention, there are formal,
practical, political, and institutional difficulties in any one of them serving that function
consistently. For that reason, the emergence of the ICC, and its anticipated jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression, might portend a significant development for assessing the legality of
humanitarian intervention. As discussed in the next section, that role would not entail approving
in advance an act of unilateral humanitarian intervention; an ex ante ICC approval process is not
contemplated as part of the amendment of the Rome Statute. Rather, the ICC’s role will arise in
the course of its reactions post hoc to instances of unilateral humanitarian intervention, which
might—if certain hurdles can be overcome—have a very different impact than the irregular and
politicized post hoc reactions of the institutions discussed above.
II. CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT THE ICC
Article 5(1)(d) of the Rome Statute includes the “crime of aggression” as one of the
crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. 43 Yet the actual exercise of that jurisdiction was made
conditional. According to Article 5(2), the Court shall only exercise jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression once an amendment to the Rome Statute is adopted, which would define the crime
badly. Moreover, as a legal institution, the Court is not especially well-positioned, prior to an
intervention, to weigh complex non-legal variables, such as the motives of intervening states, the
efficacy of further diplomatic efforts, or the ramifications to regional security if an intervention
goes forward. A post hoc assessment of an act of humanitarian intervention, if rendered, might
well be hostile to the intervention, since to date the Court in post hoc interpretations concerning
the use of force has eschewed progressive interpretations of the law. See The Corfu Channel
Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
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and set forth the conditions under which the Court can exercise its jurisdiction in this
regard. 44 It is anticipated that the Assembly of States Parties, formed after the entry into force of
the Rome Statute, will vote at their review conference in 2010 to amend the Rome Statute so as
to allow ICC exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In considering the effect, if
any, of such jurisdiction on the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, three core issues
must be considered: (1) the hurdles that must be overcome in the process of amending the Rome
Statute; (2) whether substantively the act of unilateral humanitarian intervention will be within
the scope of the new jurisdiction; and (3) what decision-maker will “trigger” the application that
jurisdiction for any given incident.
A.

Hurdles for Amending the Rome Statute

As is the case whenever one prognosticates about the possible effects of a new treaty (or,
as in this case, amendment to an existing treaty), there are certain procedural hurdles that must be
overcome before any possible effects can unfold. First, the Assembly of States Parties does have
to vote at its review conference in 2010 to amend the Rome Statute. At least a two-thirds
majority is needed to adopt an amendment; 45 it is possible that the matter will be deferred and it
is even possible that no amendment ever occurs. Second, once adopted, seven-eighths of the
existing member states must ratify the amendment before it can enter into force. 46 As of July
2008, there were 110 parties to the Rome Statute, which means at least 97 states would need to
ratify any amendment, a process that could take at least a decade and perhaps longer.
Third, normally once an amendment of the Rome Statute enters into force; it binds all the
states parties, even those parties that have not yet ratified the amendment.47 In this case,
however, since the amendment is expected to alter Article 5 of the Rome Statute, there is a
special provision in the Rome Statute that allows any state party who does not accept the
amendment to avoid exercise of the Court’s new jurisdiction with respect to acts committed by
that state’s nationals or on its territory. 48 Consequently, states that are currently parties to the
Rome Statute—including those most likely to engage in acts of humanitarian intervention, such
as France or the United Kingdom—could opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, which would then preclude the Court from addressing their conduct. Therefore, even
if the amendment enters into force, if the powerful states parties take advantage of the opt-out
clause, the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime will be seriously diminished.
Fourth, while there are 110 parties to the Rome Statute, there are some 82 states that have
not yet ratified the Statute and are not bound by it, whether amended or not. As such, the conduct
of a significant percentage of states worldwide (43%) are outside the scope of the ICC—
44
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including certain major powers that might engage in future interventions (China, Russia, the
United States)—leaving the ICC with little ability to address all incidents of potential
humanitarian intervention whenever they arise. This problem may be overcome by continuing
the gradual adherence by states to the Rome Statute; it is not yet clear whether a plateau in
membership has been reached or whether ratifications will continue apace. Alternatively, it is
possible that the ICC states parties will craft or interpret the ICC’s new jurisdiction so as to cover
acts of humanitarian intervention by non-party states whenever they are directed against party
states. If so, the ICC may regard itself as capable of exercising its jurisdiction by virtue of the
aggressive act being inflicted upon one of its parties, thus expanding the range of acts
encompassed by the new jurisdiction.
In short, there are several important, threshold hurdles that must be overcome before the
ICC will have robust jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. If any of these hurdles are not
surmounted, then the effects of this jurisdiction on the debate over legality or illegality of
humanitarian intervention will be severely reduced if not eliminated, because the ICC’s
jurisdiction will not be applicable to the wide range of state conduct within which such
interventions may arise.
B.

Whether the New Jurisdiction Will Encompass Acts of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention

Assuming that the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is established, and is
applicable to a wide range of states, then an important question is whether that jurisdiction will
encompass acts of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Prior to the adoption of the Rome
Statute, the United States opposed inclusion of the crime of aggression in part because it believed
deployment of force for “humanitarian purposes” had transformed the issue of aggression into a
far more complicated concept than was the case at Nuremberg or Tokyo. 49 That position,
obviously, did not prevail, suggesting that the states negotiating the Rome Statute ultimately
decided that, whatever complications might exist in either including or excluding humanitarian
intervention, the matter could be addressed as part of the process of defining the crime. The
Preparatory Commission established following the Rome Conference did not squarely address
the issue of humanitarian intervention, 50 nor to date has the Assembly of States Parties or its
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, which was created in 2002 to discuss the
definition, elements, and jurisdictional conditions of the crime of aggression. While some
external observers have suggested express treatment of this issue, such as by carving out
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unilateral humanitarian intervention from the crime of aggression, 51 so far no language
to that effect has emerged publicly in the working group’s proposed articles on the crime of
aggression.
Attention has been given, however, to only covering acts of aggression that are especially
grave in nature. Indeed, several states have indicated a preference for a definition of aggression
that is not co-terminus with Article 2(4) of the Charter, 52 viewing aggression as an especially
serious violation of Article 2(4). For that reason, some states proposed to the Preparatory
Commission that the crime of aggression encompass only conduct involving “aggressive” or
“large-scale” attacks on territorial integrity that are of a “particular magnitude and dimension and
of a frightening gravity and intensity.” 53 The United States, in its status as an observer, agreed
that “the crime of aggression be reserved for acts of a certain magnitude and not include all uses
of force that are inconsistent with article 2, paragraph 4.” 54 This preference has remained in the
discussions within the Special Working Group. At the December 2007 meeting, there was broad
support for retaining, after the term “act of aggression,” the phrase “which, by its character,
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” 55 Some
51
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lesser support was expressed for further qualifying “act of aggression” by language stating, “such
as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of establishing a
military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.” 56
At first glance, the inclusion of such “threshold” language might be thought to implicitly
carve out unilateral humanitarian intervention from the scope of the crime, since this intervention
has as its objective humanitarian concerns not territorial aggrandizement. Yet the act of unilateral
humanitarian intervention can be just as violent and intrusive as any other large-scale use of
force, involving extensive aerial bombardment and the deploying of extremely large numbers of
armed forces from one state to another. The “character, gravity, and scale” of Vietnam’s
intervention in Cambodia in 1978, the tripartite intervention in northern Iraq in 1991, or NATO’s
bombing of Serbia in 1999, is comparable in nature or scale to other uses of force that
presumably are to be encompassed in the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime. Even the more
restrictive threshold language defining “aggression” as “an act which has the object or result of
establishing a military occupation” does not appear to exclude all humanitarian interventions; in
all three of the arguably humanitarian interventions noted above, foreign forces remained in the
targeted territory for extended periods of time as they accomplished their claimed humanitarian
objectives. Rather than carve out humanitarian intervention, the purpose of the threshold
language now being discussed in the Special Working Group seems to be to eliminate minor
incidents of armed force from the crime of aggression, such as frontier incidents involving
border patrols or coast guards. While the final language is not settled, it does not appear that
humanitarian intervention will be either expressly or implicitly excluded from the ICC’s
definition of the crime of aggression.
A further important development related to defining the crime of aggression may be the
drafting of the detailed “elements” of the crime by the Assembly of States Parties. Article 9 of
the Rome Statute provided for the adoption by two-thirds of the Assembly of “elements” for the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which now serve to guide the ICC
judges in their interpretation of such crimes. 57 While the Rome Statute does not require the
adoption of such “elements” for the crime of aggression, the Special Working Group was
assigned this task, though at present it appears unlikely that such elements will be drafted in time
for the 2010 Review Conference (the elements for the other crimes were also not completed
when the Rome Statute was adopted; they were only completed thereafter by the Preparatory
Commission prior to entry into force of the Rome Statute). Assuming that an amendment to the
Rome Statute activating the crime of aggression is adopted in 2010, the elements for the crime
may be developed thereafter and adopted by the Assembly at some point prior to entry into force
of the amendment. If so, the language of the “elements” of the crime of aggression might be
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quite significant for indicating whether the States Parties believe that humanitarian
intervention is regarded as within or outside the scope of “aggression” (as well as for indicating
whether other forms of conduct, such as rescue of nationals, falls within aggression).
Alternatively, like the amendment itself, detailed resolution of what constitutes aggression might
not be possible, leaving the matter ambiguous on the matter. If the latter, then any effect on the
debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention will turn on the ICC’s response to incidents
of intervention as they arise.
C.

The “Trigger” for Applying Jurisdiction over Aggression When a Situation Arises

The Rome Statute requires that one of three conditions must first be met prior to the
exercise of ICC jurisdiction. For any given crime, the ICC may only investigate and prosecute
acts that were: (1) committed on the territory of, or by a national of, a state party to the Rome
Statute; (2) committed on the territory of, or by a national of, a state that has consented ad hoc to
the jurisdiction of the ICC; or (3) referred to the ICC by the Security Council. 58 For the crime of
aggression, it is anticipated that there will be an additional “trigger” or “filter” before the ICC
may exercise its jurisdiction.
Some of the current proposals before the Special Working Group envisage jurisdiction
being triggered only if the Security Council has determined that an act of aggression was
committed by a state or, at least, has adopted a resolution asking the Prosecutor to proceed with
the investigation (the latter is sometimes referred to as a “strong green light” by the Security
Council). 59 Such proposals are supported by the permanent members of the Security Council and
by a few other states, but to date are not supported by most states parties to the Rome Statute.
Other proposals envisage allowing the matter, in the first instance, to be addressed by the
Security Council. However, in the absence of Security Council action, these proposals envisage
the prosecutor after a period of time (e.g., six months) proceeding with the investigation on the
prosecutor’s own initiative or, alternatively, proceeding if authorized by a “filter” other than the
Security Council. These filters include: (1) when authorized by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber; (2)
when the General Assembly has “determined that an act of aggression has been committed”; or
(3) when the International Court of Justice makes such a determination, presumably in the form
of an advisory opinion after a request by the General Assembly, though possibly in the course of
a contentious case as well. 60
If the crime of aggression in a particular situation may only be pursued upon a finding by
the Security Council that an “act of aggression” has occurred, then the ICC’s jurisdiction over
this crime may not have any significance whatsoever, let alone have an impact on the legality of
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humanitarian intervention. The Security Council virtually never declares that transboundary uses
of force are acts of aggression; even North Korea’s attack on South Korea in 1950 and Iraq’s
1990 invasion of Kuwait were characterized by the Security Council as a “breach of international
peace,” not an act of “aggression.” 61 As such, if the triggering mechanism is a Security Council
finding of “aggression,” then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime may well be still-born.
Alternatively, if a possible crime of aggression may be investigated simply upon a
request of the Security Council to the ICC (without a Security Council finding of “aggression”),
then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime might also be severely curtailed. The willingness of
the Security Council to issue such a request may be just as unlikely as a finding of “aggression.”
Certainly, such a request will not be issued in situations where any of the permanent members is
the state (or is closely allied with the state) allegedly perpetrating the aggression. Hence, under
this approach the ICC’s jurisdiction might be reduced solely to instances where a relatively
isolated or “outlaw” state has engaged in the conduct (e.g., Iraq in 1990), such that there is
sufficient support on the Security Council and among the permanent members for issuing the
request. If so, the erratic nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression likely
would have little effect in clarifying the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, for the
failure to prosecute such conduct as a crime could be interpreted as the result of major power
politics, rather than a belief that the underlying conduct is permissible.
A similar outcome may be likely if the amendment only allows the ICC to proceed, in the
absence of Security Council action, whenever the General Assembly or the International Court
has “determined that an act of aggression has been committed.” Like the Security Council, the
General Assembly has only rarely found “aggression” to have occurred, letting pass by fairly
momentous incidents of forceful action within any such condemnation. 62 A General Assembly
request to the International Court for an advisory opinion 63 on whether “aggression” has
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occurred seems equally unlikely; certainly no such request has been made to the
International Court over the past sixty years even in situations where blatant aggression has
occurred. Moreover, when on the rare occasion that the legality of acts of force have arisen on
the merits in a contentious case, the Court has limited itself to finding a violation of the principle
of “non-use of force” expressed in Article 2(4) of the Charter (or its counterpart in customary
international law), 64 not a finding of an “act of aggression.” 65
One might speculate that an amendment to the Rome Statute will change the practice of
the Security Council, General Assembly, or International Court. Arguably, once those
institutions know that their determinations concerning aggression will have a collateral
consequence for the work of the ICC, then those institutions may be more apt to focus on the
issuance of such a determination. If the amendment has that effect, then perhaps the discussion
outlined below concerning a triggering mechanism involving just the ICC will be relevant for a
triggering mechanism that turns on Security Council, General Assembly or ICJ action. But if the
amendment does not change existing practice, then it seems that any approach to the triggering
of ICC jurisdiction that requires action by those institutions would have little effect in clarifying
the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
If, however, the language ultimately adopted in amending the Rome Statute allows for
the prosecutor to proceed in the absence of Security Council action, either on the prosecutor’s
own initiative or after authorization by the Trial Chamber, then there may well be significant
ramifications over the long term for the debate on the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention. In such circumstances, the mere fact that the ICC mandate is broad enough to allow
the prosecution of leaders that engage in humanitarian intervention will likely not affect the
debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention. Only if the Rome Statute were amended
so as to expressly identify unilateral humanitarian intervention as a form of aggression would the
position of opponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention be strengthened, just as an
express exclusion of such intervention as a form of aggression would strengthen the position of
64
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humanitarian intervention’s proponents. What will count is how the ICC responds when
incidents of unilateral humanitarian intervention arise. Prosecutions, or at least indictments, of
leaders of those interventions will considerably strengthen the hand of those who oppose
unilateral humanitarian intervention. Yet an unwillingness on the part of the ICC to indict and
prosecute those leaders—an outcome that seems quite likely for incidents of true humanitarian
intervention—will lend considerable credence to the view that unilateral humanitarian
intervention is either lawful or tolerated by the international community.
An ICC prosecutor (or prosecutor in conjunction with the Pre-Trial Chamber) is
extremely unlikely to indict the leader of a state who has embarked on a transboundary use of
force that is truly designed to end a widespread deprivation of human rights. If the intervention is
conducted in a manner approximating the kinds of criteria that have been identified for “true”
humanitarian intervention—such as the five criteria of “legitimacy” formulated by the SecretaryGeneral's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 66 —both legal and political
dynamics will push the prosecutor away from indictment. The legal dynamics include the general
discretion the prosecutor has not to indict in situations where it would appear unjust to do so,
which undoubtedly will exist when the intervening state is attempting to stop a very seriousness
threat to human lives, has exhausted other available means, and is limiting the intervention to
what is necessary and appropriate to remove the threat. The Rome Statute provides that the
prosecutor, when deciding whether it initiate an investigation, shall consider whether, “[t]aking
into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” 67 Further, to the
extent that there is uncertainly about the criminality of a particular kind of conduct, the Rome
Statute provides that the “definition of a crime shall be strictly construed” and that in “case of
ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted.” 68 Finally, the Rome Statute provides that a person shall not be
criminally responsible if the person is acting to reasonably defend other persons, 69 or in
circumstances where the conduct was caused by “duress resulting from a threat of imminent
death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against” persons, so long as the person
“acts necessarily and reasonable to avoid this threat” and “does not intend to cause a greater
harm that than the one sought to be avoided.” 70 Provisions of that sort provide a prosecutor with
ample ability to engage in a nuanced assessment of whether in a given situation the overall
interests of justice have been served by conduct that might technically fall within the scope of
66
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aggression, but that should not be sanctioned. 71
Moreover, the legal dynamics may include certain benefits secured by the Prosecutor
from the intervention, since the target state might well be one harboring persons already under
indictment by the ICC and the intervening states can assist in bringing those persons into ICC
custody (an initiative they will be less enthusiastic about if their leaders are themselves facing
indictment). The political dynamics include the difficulty for the ICC of condemning an
intervention that is either popular or largely tolerated by states and the broader global
community, particularly if intervenors are a collective of states that are generally supportive of
the ICC, perhaps including major financial supporters. Even of the intervenor is just a single
state, if the objective is to oust a horrific regime, one that has committed extensive war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and perhaps even genocide (Idi Amin in Uganda or the Khmer Rouge
in Cambodia), the ICC’s political stature may suffer considerably if it is perceived as protecting
that regime.
Could the Prosecutor find a way to avoid indicting the leaders of the intervening state(s)
without establishing any precedent for the legality of the intervention? As is the case for
statements by public officials of states, it is certainly possible for the ICC Prosecutor to be silent
or at least vague about the reasons for not initiating a prosecution, or to announce that lack of
evidence exists on certain points necessary to pursue a criminal case against government
leaders. 72 Obfuscation can go a long way in making it difficult for a clear legal precedent to
emerge. At the same time, there may be considerable pressure upon the prosecutor to indicate
clearly the position being taken by the ICC, just as there was when various states, human rights
organizations, and others charged that NATO’s conduct of the 1999 bombing campaign against
Serbia violated the laws of war. In that instance, the chief prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) felt compelled to establish a committee
within the Office of the Prosecutor to examine the allegations. After receiving and reviewing the
committee’s detailed report (which was subsequently made public), she informed the U.N.
Security Council that there was no basis to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of the
NATO campaign. 73 Similarly, in a situation where the ICC has declined to investigate or
prosecute the leaders of a campaign of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the ICC prosecutor
may be expected to report to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute on the factors
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that led to that decision, including specific reasons why the intervention is considered
“humanitarian.” 74
The ICC might also try to argue that its failure to condemn an intervention as
“aggression” does not necessarily mean that the ICC regards the intervention as a lawful use of
force, since the ICC’s concept of aggression aims at the most grave of forcible acts. For two
reasons, however, that distinction may not prove significant. First, while the current drafts on the
definition of aggression do contemplate a narrower class of forcible actions than those covered
by Article 2(4), the forcible actions being excluded seem relatively insignificant, such that the
term “aggression” is an inexact but close approximation of Article 2(4). Indeed, the proposed
amendment leans heavily on the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution on the definition of
aggression, which begins by stating that “[a]ggression is the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” 75 —language that mimics
Article 2(4). As such, it will not seem very credible for the ICC to argue that an act of
humanitarian intervention falls outside the scope of its crime of aggression, unless the
intervention is of a very minor nature (e.g., a speedy rescue of hostages that involves no loss of
life). Second, a distinction of this type will likely be lost in the public domain; when the ICC
determines that the leaders of an intervention will not be investigated or indicted for aggression,
the natural perception is that the ICC believes the intervention to be legal. Arguing that an
intervention might still be a violation of Article 2(4) but just is not within the scope of the ICC’s
jurisdiction is the type of position that will likely gain little traction in the realm of political and
popular discourse, which tends to approach such issues in more a black/white (legal/illegal)
fashion.
Establishing the unlikelihood of the ICC indicting the leaders of states who embark on
unilateral humanitarian intervention is difficult, given the embryonic status of the ICC. In an
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attempt to at least sketch out this point, however, the next section considers what would
have happened if an ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression had existed at the time of
NATO’s intervention with respect to Kosovo.
III. WOULD THE ICC HAVE INDICTED NATO’S LEADERS
FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION FOR THE KOSOVO INTERVENTION? 76
A.

Effect of ICC Jurisdiction Prior to the Kosovo Intervention

The underlying facts of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia (then known as the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY) on behalf of Kosovar Albanians has been amply recounted
elsewhere and will not be repeated here. 77 Needless to say, given that the intervention seemed
largely directed at protecting an ethnic group from its own government (a government that had
unleashed considerable strife in the Balkans in the first half of the 1990s), the intervention stirred
an extensive debate about its legality, with considerable attention focusing on whether the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention was a viable component of contemporary international
law. 78
Assuming the existence of an ICC at the time with jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, would that fact alone have inhibited NATO states from engaging in such
intervention? Article 2(4) of the Charter itself is broad enough in scope to be viewed by many
states and scholars as precluding humanitarian intervention, yet that fact alone did not inhibit
NATO from proceeding. Rather, most NATO states asserted that their conduct was lawful
without reliance on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for support.
For example, the United States relied upon various factors that, when taken together, the
United States believed justified the action. These factors included: (1) the commission by the
FRY military and police of serious and widespread violations of international law in the FRY
province of Kosovo against Kosovar Albanians; (2) the threat that FRY actions in Kosovo could
lead to a wider conflict in Europe; (3) the FRY’s failure to comply with agreements with NATO
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding FRY actions in Kosovo;
(4) the FRY’s failure to comply with Security Council resolutions regarding FRY actions in
Kosovo; (5) the FRY’s failure to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia; and (6) the FRY’s failure to abide by its own unilateral commitments. 79
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Would the additional factor of the ICC possibly indicting NATO leaders have altered the
situation? The answer to that question would seem to turn on whether NATO leaders would have
anticipated the ICC indicting them, for only then might NATO leaders have been deterred. Since
the ICC is a new institution, there is no track record for understanding its practice for issuing
indictments in such situations and, until that practice settles, the ability to deter may be weak.
The next sub-section concludes that the ICC likely would not have indicted NATO leaders for
their intervention in Kosovo. If that assessment is correct, and if NATO leaders would have
predicted a similar outcome, then the existence as of early 1999 of an ICC with jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression likely would not have had any effect in deterring the Kosovo
intervention.
B.

Likelihood of ICC Prosecution after the Kosovo Intervention

After conducting an investigation, a prosecutor considering whether to indict leaders of
NATO for the Kosovo intervention would likely have begun with the text of the Rome Statute
and the elements of the crime of aggression. The analysis would have continued by noting that
the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force (Article 2(4)) absent Security Council authorization
(under Chapters VII or VIII) or when acting in self-defense (Article 51). Although there were
certain Security Council resolutions passed in advance of the intervention relating to Kosovo,
which in part recognized the situation as a “threat to international peace and security,” those
resolutions did not authorize the use of force. 80 And, although some assertions were made that
Europe as whole was threatened by the conflict in Kosovo (since other states such as Turkey and
Greece might become involved), those assertions seemed thin at the time and even thinner today.
In any event, NATO and its member states did not report the intervention to the Security Council
as provided for in Article 51. State practice since enactment of the Charter has not altered these
basic provisions of the Charter. 81 As such, at first glance it seems that a prosecutor would have
viewed the decision by NATO leaders to unleash the intervention as a crime of aggression. 82
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At the same time, the prosecutor would have been confronted with a constellation of
other factors weighing against indictment. First, the prosecutor would have presumably seen
some significance in the types of factors that animate the natural law tradition. Under that
tradition, rather than just parse the language of the Charter and related state practice, the natural
law theorist would emphasize the moral necessity of acting to prevent the widespread
deprivation of human rights. This tradition emphasizes that any international rule focused on the
preservation of order at the expense of justice is destined to fail, and thus the law must allow for
intervention in extreme cases. Since intervention to protect human rights seeks neither to alter
territorial boundaries nor to depose existing governments, it does not endanger the core attributes
of sovereignty that Article 2(4) seeks to protect territorial sovereignty. While everyone would
prefer the original Charter scheme of a well-functioning Security Council capable of deploying
forces, the unfortunate reality is that the Security Council has no such forces at its disposal and,
due to political exigencies, at times is paralyzed from even authorizing individual states to act on
its behalf, such as occurred with respect to the crisis in Kosovo. In such situations, states cannot
be expected to stand by while people die; the Charter was not a suicide pact. 83 If the prosecutor
perceived such factors to be present, then it would weigh against indictment; for all prosecutors,
their discretion not to indict turns not solely on the formal content of the law, but on extraneous
factors that are more contextual in nature.
Second, a prosecutor would no doubt be influenced by the fact that this “unilateral”
humanitarian intervention involved sixteen NATO countries—fully democratic and therefore
fully accountable to their people—collectively deciding that the intervention was justified as a
matter of international law and policy. Thirteen of those countries actually engaged in the
bombing campaign. Further, while some non-NATO states asserted that the intervention should
not have gone forward without Security Council authorization, many non-NATO states
supported the intervention.
There were, of course, states that quite openly opposed the intervention, notably China,
India, and Russia, as well as states typically hostile to all major actions pursued by the United
States, such as Cuba. And there were other states that were clearly uneasy with the intervention
but fell short of formally condemning it. Public protests occurred in various states worldwide.
Yet, while reasonable minds can differ, the intervention received relatively widespread
acceptance—whether viewed as affirmative support or passive toleration—of a kind not seen in
some prior incidents of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In light of this, for a prosecutor to
claim that the intervention in Kosovo was unlawful would likely face considerable criticism from
a variety of quarters.
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Third, the prosecutor would have noted the reactions of key international organizations to
the intervention. In particular, when a resolution condemning the air campaign was placed before
the Security Council on March 26, 1999, the resolution was defeated by a vote of 12 to 3. 84
Among those 12 states were several non-NATO members, such as Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil,
Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, and Slovenia. Similarly, a Russian draft resolution before the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights calling for “an immediate cessation of the fighting” and
attributing “victims and casualties amongst the civilian population [to] missile strikes and
bombings” failed by a vote of 11 to 24, with 18 states abstaining. 85
The prosecutor would have noted that the General Assembly did not condemn the
intervention, as it did when Vietnam intervened in Cambodia in 1978 and when the United States
intervened in Grenada and Panama in 1983 and 1989. Nor did the General Assembly even pass a
resolution demanding a withdrawal of forces, as it did when India intervened in East Pakistan in
1971. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor would have noted that the Organization of the Islamic
Conference declared that “a decisive international action was necessary to prevent humanitarian
catastrophe and further violations of human rights” in Kosovo. 86
Fourth, the prosecutor would be influenced by the series of factors that ultimately led to
the first deployment of war by NATO forces since its inception: (1) in Serbia, there was a
government with a track record of brutal ethnic cleansing that was inflicting increasing levels of
violence against a civilian population in one of its historically autonomous regions; (2) the
Security Council had expressly identified actions taken by the government as a threat to the
peace which could lead to humanitarian catastrophe even if it had not yet; and (3) that
government had refused to abide by the demands of the Security Council, including agreements
that the government itself has made with the international community and that had been endorsed
by the Security Council.
Fifth, the prosecutor would be influenced by the “end game” of the intervention: are the
interveners seizing territory as part of their “humanitarian intervention” or is there conduct
generally perceived as limited to what is necessary and proportionate in carrying out the
humanitarian objective? In the case of Kosovo, the Security Council itself—with Russia’s
affirmative vote—ultimately accepted the reality of the intervention by authorizing activities
associated with the cease-fire agreement, an agreement negotiated fully with Russian
involvement. 87 While Serb forces were basically expelled from Kosovo, Kosovo did not fall
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within the dominion of an aggressor; it was patrolled by a NATO-led multinational
coalition, including Russian troops. Again, Security Council action to move forward with
conflict management should not be viewed as a wholesale endorsement by all Security Council
members of all preceding actions, but Russia’s and China’s willingness to support this new U.N.
administered territory would likely have influenced the decision of an ICC prosecutor as to
whether to indict.
Sixth, the prosecutor perhaps would be influenced by the broader scenario unfolding in
terms of crimes other than the crime against aggression. In a situation of true humanitarian
intervention, it is likely that the leaders of the targeted state have committed violations in the
form of crimes against humanity, genocide, or widespread war crimes. As such, the ICC may
well be focused on the leaders of the targeted state, just as the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the time of the Kosovo intervention was already focused on
Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Miloševi , for his conduct in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.
In May 1999, in the midst of the NATO bombing campaign in support of Kosovar Albanians,
Miloševi was indicted for 340 counts of murder, stemming from seven separate massacres, and
some 740,000 forced deportations from Kosovo since the beginning of 1999. 88 For an
international criminal tribunal to declare, on the one hand, that the leaders of a country
committed acts of violence against civilians but, on the other hand, it is a crime for others to stop
them, would place the tribunal in a very awkward position.
Similarly, if the tribunal determines that the intervening states adhered to the jus in bello
in the course of their intervention—as was determined by the ICTY in assessing NATO’s
conduct in the Kosovo intervention 89 —that too may influence the prosecutor’s decision
regarding the crime of aggression. While as a theoretical matter, it is certainly possible to
commit a violation of the jus ad bellum while committing no violations of the jus in bello, it
might prove politically awkward to find the former but not the latter.
Finally, while a prosecutor may be somewhat insulated from external pressures, and is
not a political entity such as the Security Council or General Assembly, only the most naive
observer would reject the possibility of political influences on the prosecutor. A prosecutor
would have had to possess a rather sturdy confidence to proceed with indictments for the crime
of aggression against multiple leaders of Western democratic states, including U.S. President Bill
Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, German
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema, especially when
some of those countries are major financial supporters of the tribunal. Indeed, some observers
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believe NATO did commit jus in bello violations in the course of its bombing campaign, 90 such
that one explanation for the lack of indictments with respect to jus in bello crimes is the old saw
“don’t bite the hand that feeds you.”
IV. EFFECTS OF CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The ironic effect of activating a crime of aggression that is broad enough in scope to
cover an act of unilateral humanitarian intervention may be to crystallize, over time, a norm that
regards such intervention as lawful. Assuming that the crime of aggression (and associated
elements) is drafted so as to neither expressly include nor exclude unilateral humanitarian
intervention, and instead to simply criminalize large-scale transboundary uses of force, the
definition will sweep within its range humanitarian interventions that take the form of bombing
campaigns or deployment of military forces, such as was seen in NATO’s action against Serbia
in 1999. Assuming further that the Security Council, General Assembly, or International Court of
Justice are not the sole triggering mechanisms for determining if an act of aggression has
occurred, then considerable discretion will be accorded the ICC prosecutor (perhaps in
conjunction with the Pre-Trial Chamber) to determine which forcible acts are lawful and which
are not. As such, when the ICC is confronted in the years to come with an intervention that is not
authorized by the Security Council but that is truly humanitarian, it seems likely that the ICC
will not regard such conduct as aggression, resulting in a perception that unilateral humanitarian
intervention is lawful. A further effect may be clarification by the ICC of what constitutes “true”
humanitarian intervention. As indicated in Section II, when deciding not to investigate or
prosecute the leaders of states that have engaged in such intervention, the ICC prosecutor may
feel compelled to explain publicly why ICC action is not forthcoming. Presumably the
prosecutor would focus on the kinds of criteria that have been previously suggested for
humanitarian intervention, such as by the recent U.N. high-level panel or in the academic
community. 91
This article has focused on how activating the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression may affect the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, if the analysis above
is correct, then there may be a variety of other effects relating to other types of transnational uses
of force, such as the use of military force by one state against another state to rescue its nationals
or to restore to power a democratically-elected leader who was ousted by a military coup. Like
humanitarian intervention, these other forms of transnational use of force have their critics and
supporters when it comes to assessing legality. Were the ICC to begin weighing in on whether
such forcible actions constitute aggression, it may considerably influence the legal debate,
leading to crystallization and clarification of the relevant norm one way or the other.
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If all this comes to pass, the result may be to place the ICC in a very significant position
as the ultimate arbiter of lawful uses of military force, one that will shape the contours of the jus
ad bellum over the next generation. Supporters of the ICC may welcome this development,
applauding its ability to clarify a field of law that currently seems unstable and, at times,
ineffective. 92 If the Security Council remains unable to act because of major power resistance,
the ICC—perceived as objective and non-political in nature—may emerge as the relevant voice
in condemning or blessing transnational uses of force.
Yet such power would bring with it considerable risks. If the ICC is seen as the “go-to”
arbiter for whether an intervention is permissible, and if the ICC blesses an intervention as
humanitarian and not aggressive in nature, then considerable political repercussions may flow for
the ICC if the intervention ultimately goes poorly, perhaps with the intervening state(s)
mishandling relief operations, inadvertently provoking internal strife, failing to rebuild
infrastructure destroyed by the intervention, or neglecting fundamental rule of law initiatives
necessary to stabilize the targeted state. Conversely, the ICC might condemn, through the
issuance of indictments, a use of force that ultimately proves extremely successful in replacing a
tyrannical regime with one that is much more disposed toward representative democracy and
human rights. Further, if there is insufficient consistency and practice in the role of the ICC in
this area, broader adverse consequences might unfold as well. Unless the relevant lines are
clearly drawn by the ICC, the core normative structure of the jus ad bellum might be weakened,
especially if a belief emerges that some undefined forms of non-defensive force, undertaken
without Security Council authorization, are acceptable. Moreover, to the extent that the ICC
emerges as the central player in assessing the legality of recourse to force, it does so at the
expense of the Security Council, which may harm the reputation and status of the global
institution charged with maintaining international peace and security. (In order to recapture that
role, the Security Council might be more inclined to address squarely the legality of uses of force
when they occur, which would be a positive development for collective security.)
Potential “blowback’ from decisions reached by the ICC are not fatal to its work, and will
occur to some degree in any event for decisions reached by the ICC concerning the other types of
crimes within its jurisdiction. Yet the stakes are considerably higher with respect to the crime of
aggression, and while being at the center of attention has some benefits, it can also mean being at
the center of a precarious and potentially damaging storm.
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